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Abstract
In Moroccan history, Sufis maintained close ties with the makhzan, the sharifian state.
Nevertheless, these ties were predicated on a balance of power relations between the two
sides. A great deal of existing sources deal primarily with political activism and mystical
aspects of the Sufi orders. Yet, researchers have neglected the rather complicated and
nuanced connection between religious dimension and political landscapes of the sharifian
state. Thus, this tendency has led to potential bias and, at worst, false pictures of the
religio-political role of Sufism in interacting with the central sultanate in
pre-protectorate-period Morocco.
This thesis proposes a new interpretation of the shifting relationship between Sufism
and the Moroccan state in the early twentieth century. More specifically, it explores the
Kettaniyya order as tangible evidence of the link between the spiritual guidance of the
Sufi cheikh and his ideals of preserving religious legitimacy and ensuring national
security between 1908 and 1909. Mohammed Al-Kettani, the leader of the brotherhood,
had borne tremendous ire against the Alaouite sultan, Abdel-Hafid, for his failure to
maintain order in Morocco. I argue that the effort to ensure the religious legitimacy of the
Kettaniyya Sufi order was the main vehicle for Mohammed Al-Kettani’s challenge to the
political structures of Abdel-Hafid. The deployment of the baraka power in tandem with
his symbolic weight paved the road for the creation of an institutional framework that
unified rural allies to counter the Alaouite state. Henceforth, a nuanced and critical
analysis of existing studies of the Sufi cheikh facilitates an understanding of a variety of
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profound and essential facets of the Kettaniyya order between 1908 and 1909.
Keywords: Sufism, Kettaniyya, Sultanate, Morocco, Cohesion, Religious Legitimacy
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Even if I converted, my experience of living the religion could never be Moroccan, because I am
not Moroccan and can’t erase the years in which my own cultural sense of religion has been so
deeply imprinted onto me. I’m embarrassed that I continued to cling for so long to the vague
Orientalist fantasy.

--Rachel Newcomb “A Distant Episode”
Introduction
Newcomb, an American author married to a Moroccan Muslim, was eager to visit a
Sufi tomb in Morocco for her anthropology research and learn more about saintly life via
interviews with Moroccans. Contrary to the hope of obtaining information on Sufism and
Sufi saints, the author realized it was difficult to reconcile her own personal status, as a
Western Christian, with the Muslim community in the country. Furthermore, her desire
for conversion to Islam had run into obstacles because of her long-lasting passion for “the
vague Orientalist fantasy,” that is, the obsession with Sufi dance, poetry, religious
practices, and other exotic cultural production. 1 Acknowledging the number of
Orientalists, colonial administrators, and outsiders who consistently provide biased
pictures and tendentious statements about places like Morocco, Newcomb felt
embarrassed, albeit unsurprised, when she perceived that the locals had been wary of her
true intentions. Anecdotes like this one sparked my passion to critically and contextually
explore the interplay between religion and history in Morocco. As a Chinese student who
does not have any religious background and is interested in Middle Eastern Studies and
Islam, I have to be as considerate and rational as possible when evaluating other cultures,
religions, and histories. Especially in academic projects, as in the case of Newcomb,

1 Rachel Newcomb, “A Distant Episode: Religion and Belief in Moroccan Ethnography,” in
Encountering Morocco: Fieldwork and Cultural Understanding, ed. David Crawford & Rachel
Newcomb (Indiana University Press, 2013), 143.
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positionality must be accounted for in order to minimize bias and comprehend the
sources.
Hence, one of the main purposes of this thesis is to complicate some widespread
generalizations by illuminating an important example of Sufism as a spiritual and
political phenomenon. It also seeks to question and cast doubts on some distorted
perspectives from Western scholars toward Sufism in Morocco. More specifically, this
thesis investigates the Kettaniyya order as tangible evidence of the link between the
spiritual guidance of the Sufi cheikh and his ideals of preserving religious legitimacy and
ensuring national security between 1908 and 1909. Through the examination of this
particular religious order, one is able to map out the shifting relationship between the Sufi
leader and the political structure of Morocco, the sharifian state led by Alaouite sultans.
In carrying out this research, I have tried to keep in mind and be considerate of potential
bias and misunderstanding on the Moroccan context, especially when considering source
material from outside observers.
Sufi orders have been present in Morocco since at least the 12th century. Believers
have preached Islamic doctrines and Sufi principles to uneducated farmers, rural villagers,
and marginalized communities in the Rif regions, far away from the urban settings.
Because Sufis explore internally hidden aspects of spirits and personal enlightenment,
they have been seen as an apolitical entity, especially in recent times. In Moroccan
history, however, Sufis maintained close ties with the makhzan, the sharifian state. They
were mutually interdependent, as the sultan relied on Sufi cheikhs to strengthen his role
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as Ameer Al-Moumineen while the Sufis were in need of economic protection and
recourse from the state. Without doubt, this mutual interplay was predicated on the use of
power and the consistence of interchange between both sides. In some instances,
especially following the Pan-Islam trend that had united the Muslim umma, or the
Muslim community, in order to counter the French forces into the Moroccan territory in
the late 19th century, Sufi communities were willing to cooperate with the sultanate, along
with other Muslim tribal affiliations, for national stability;2 while in other occasions, they
tended to challenge the central authority either for the latter’s failure of offering gifts and
religious services or the incapability (and negligence) of protecting the nation from
corruption and foreign invasions. As we shall see in this thesis, Mohammed Al-Kettani
had borne tremendous ire against the Alaouite sultan for his failure to maintain order in
Morocco between 1908 and 1909. In sum, despite their objective of ensuring social unity,
cultural cohesion, and religious legitimacy, Sufis would resort to protests and resistance
once contingent factors disturbed, or even subverted, the power balance with the state.
In this thesis, I argue that the efforts of ensuring religious legitimacy of the
Kettaniyya Sufi order was the main vehicle for the religio-political agenda of Mohammed
Al-Kettani in challenging the political structures of Abdel-Hafid. This religious endeavor
paved the way for the creation of an institutional framework that unified rural allies to
counter the inefficacy of the Alaouite sultanate. This charismatic leader, in his

This idea of unity and cohesion (or coalition) would constitute a very important strategy for
tribes to rise up against any opposing parties. See Edmund Burke, “Pan-Islam and Moroccan
Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912,” The Journal of African History 13, no. 1
(1972): 115.
2
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deployment of the baraka power, combined symbolic capital and religious vitality to
intervene directly into Moroccan politics.

Sources and limitations
It is no surprise to learn that Sufism plays an important, and, in some cases, a
predominant role, in influencing the historicity and historiography of the Muslim nations.
As a matter of fact, after a swift glance over the nature of Sufism and its historical impact
on the process of nation building, I grew critical of this so-called “Islamic mysticism.” I
am not intending to deny here the prominently “mystical” nature of Sufism, but, as
Joseph Hill says in introducing the potential bias against this practice that it “was
introduced throughout much of the now-predominantly Muslim world by scholars who
practiced Sufism, and Sufi thought consequently permeated the default Islam, scholarly
and otherwise.” 3 According to Hill, the “default Islam” results from the scholarly
prejudice against Sufism worldwide. It is shocking that a number of western modernists
regard Sufism as a highly superstitious religious practice without practical values. The
lack of a deepening study and a nuanced viewpoint has attributed a rather biased and
tendentious trait to this terminology.
A multitude of scholarly investigations have centered on the simple, ideological
binaries of democracy vs. Islam (including Sufism), Christian vs. Muslim (including Sufi),
and good vs. evil. The scarcity of a more authentic and objective perspective toward

3 Joseph Hill, “Sufism between Past and Modernity,” in Handbook of Contemporary Islam
and Muslim Lives, eds. M.Woodward and R.Luken-Bull (Springer Nature Switzerland, 2019), 2.
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Sufism has led to such criticism. Therefore, it is essential to ensure impartiality and
fairness in treating such kind of subject matter. In other words, one has to nuance and be
critical about existing sources, be it intellectual undertakings or literary scholarships, for a
clarified, detailed, and even an apologetic discourse of Sufism across continents, and, in
this particular case, the colonial history of the Kettaniyya Sufi order par excellence.
What is known about Mohammed Al-Kettani is derived primarily from French
ethnographic studies and colonial journals, correspondences, reports, and memoirs from
1907 to 1927. While such sources certainly provide significant perspectives on the life
and times of the Sufi leader and his objectives, the over-reliance has led to a number of
misconceptions about and prejudices against domestic society and monarchical regime.
The political implications the Kettaniyya order, in particular, had long-lasting effects on
the religious cohesion of the Sufi order between 1908 and 1909. Nonetheless, the
academic interest of the French power had relied on their impression on the Moroccan
religious rituals and their mystical aspects, and in turn, gravitated to underestimate the
latter’s efficacy in modernizing/reforming the country. As I would argue throughout the
thesis, the French presented a highly biased picture of the Kettaniyya movement without
taking so much account on the Sufi legitimacy.
More specifically, because of the heavy concentration on the notion of “military”
jihad and armed activism, experts have neglected the role of cultural resistance (i.e.
symbolic capital of Al-Kettani and his pursuance of the greater jihad) in linking religious
dimension to the historical context of colonialism in Morocco between 1908 and 1909.
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Moreover, the little or no regular access to the Moroccan makhzan to conduct adequate
studies on the country has been accountable for the failure to produce a functional
analysis of the Kettaniyya resistance against the sharifian state.4 Thus, the colonial
administrators and policy-makers had to rely on regular reports, existing travelogues,
daily or weekly journals, rumors, and other media to refine their colonial archives for
developmental and tactical usage. As later sections suggest, the French even supported
and financed an arabophone newspaper, “The Sa’ada,” in order to promote their colonial
ambitions and propagated European ideas in Morocco. Through the usage of the Arabic
language as a medium to advance their project, the French regarded the newspaper
production as an effective tool to foreground Al-Kettani’s hypocritical intention and
highly militant behavior in an indirect way. Thus, an excessive reliance on these largely
misguided sources without critically expressing a synthetic point of view would
tremendously underestimate the profound and even authentic facet of Mohammed
Al-Kettani and his intent as a Sufi leader. In this thesis, I examine French colonial sources
alongside recent scholarship to propose a new interpretation of the shifting relationship
between Sufism and the Moroccan state in the early twentieth century. Through a careful
and critical evaluation of existing studies, one is able to garner a set of invaluable
information on the essences of the Kettaniyya order between 1908 and 1909.

4 Edmund Burke, “The Invention of Moroccan Islam,” in The Ethnographic State: France
and the Invention of Moroccan Islam (University of California Press, 2014), 172.

13

The notion of segmentation
Since Sufi brotherhoods are centered on the rural region far from the urban space in
Morocco, a general glance at the tribal system and the notion of segmentation will
facilitate deeper understanding of the functionality and mechanism of maintaining
internal order among each tribe. According to Ernest Gellner, a well-known social
anthropologist, the theory of segmentation is defined as the practice of social cohesion
without regulation from central authority. 5 Segmentation is different from tribalism
because the former concentrates on the “balancing and opposition of constituent groups”
through social and political interests without interventions from authority, while the latter
is, more or less, subject to central authority. 6 Segmentation applies to many tribal
societies with various effects. At least in the Moroccan Sufi case, however, it is not
always the case that this system of segmentation maintains tribal order in the rural society.
Its stability and maintenance are predicated on coherent regional authorities and their
power to challenge the national government, or makhzan, when it becomes incapable of
controlling outside forces within the country. This section will provide a general view of
segmentary theory and its pertinence to the dynamics of political dissent and conflict in
Moroccan’s urban and rural spaces, especially between 1908 and 1909.
In terms of gathering regional notables and religious disciples for social cohesion, the
clear-cut boundaries between each tribe consolidate their inner circle. These bonds
promote coherence and uniformity among tribal and Sufi forces in order to check and
5 Ernest Gellner, “The Problem,” in Saints of the Atlas (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson,
1969), 41.
6 Ibid., 42.
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challenge any opposing parties within and without the country.7 The close bond of the
segmentation is largely due to the emergence of highly capable groups/actors who are
eager to challenge the foreign invasion in defending the domestic state and their
communities. The role of religion in maintaining social order has refined the traditional
system of segmentation and cohesion. The bonds still exist but religious saints have to
abide by the Islamic shari’a besides their tradition customs, or the urf.8 Therefore, the
Islamic/Sufi saints have their own systematic and interdependent approach toward
maintaining tribal and religious order.
Mohammed Al-Kettani, the Sufi leader of the Kettaniyya brotherhood in rural
Morocco, stood out as a prominent religious figure who sought to challenge and oppose
the sultan’s regime in not fulfilling his promises after his enthronement in 1907, which
included the containment of foreign power. The subsequent events between 1908 and
1909 foregrounded the political and religious presence of the Kettaniyya order that
Al-Kettani led. The highly political-oriented segmentation mechanism he adopted
emphasized the institutionalization of the Sufi community.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the French colonial administrators observed
closely the action and attitude of the Moroccan tribal and Sufi forces in the rural regions.
Therefore, they discovered the trace of “an organized solidarity” within cohorts of the
Sufi order, which fostered the latter’s internal uniformity and cohesion. According to the
colonial report in 1925, “they (the administrators) found in the brotherhood a very large
Ibid., 42.
I drew this piece from lecture notes and presentation while in Morocco last year, in the
class of “The Political System of the Maghreb.”
7
8
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clan, led by chief who provided housing and economic provisions on an individual basis.
It was a step toward organized solidarity.”9 This “organized solidarity” not only made
possible independent mechanisms of socio-economic welfare and support within tribal
and religious circles, but also, at least partially, fulfilled the spiritual satisfaction of their
members. This description is important in that it helps to explain the cohesiveness of Sufi
allies under the leadership of Mohammed Al-Kettani. I argue that French recognition of
this “organized solidarity” during the incidents between 1908 and 1909 motivated their
later profound research on the Sufi leaders in Moroccan rural society. My analysis of
some of this research highlights the way different aspects of religious “solidarity,” such
as rituals and collective da’awa, contributed to the internal cohesion and unity of the
Kettaniyya order. Furthermore, it illuminates the changing orientation of Mohammed
Al-Kettani and his allies between 1908 and 1909, which fused religious legitimacy with
political mobilization for the sake of national and religious interests. The ambivalent
relationship with different political actors in the country mapped out the politically
adversarial nature of the Kettaniyya Sufi group under the leadership of the Sufi cheikh.

Mohammed Al-Kettani: a guardian of Sufi tradition
Before investigating deeper the personality and religio-political strategy of the Sufi
cheikh, it is essential to lay out the geographical significance in relation to the power
struggle between the French, the Alaouite sultan, and the Sufi leader. Fes, the then capital
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2.

La Pensée Française: Organe D’expansion Française et de Propagation Nationale, 1925,
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city of Morocco, was the battleground between Bilad al-makhzan, the land of the
sharifian central authority in the urban setting, and Bilad al-siba, the land of dissidence in
remote mountainous regions where most Berbers and rural notables were residing. The
proximity between both sides not only reinforced their close ties and connections, be it
cooperation or clashes, but also contained the French power from imposing control over
the city. Especially in the pre-protectorate-period Morocco, the interaction between the
urban space and the rural area had posed a real threat to French (European) penetration in
the early 20th century.10 It was not until 1912 had the capital city moved from Fes to
Rabat. The relocation of the capital (and also the sultan) to the coastal area had facilitated
French penetration into the country, both because of its relatively easier communication
with the metropolis and its absence from disturbances from nearby tribes. After all, the
period of 1908-1911 marked a crucial transition to a relatively loose connection between
the two regions. This “divorce” and rift of both sides would function as a drive for the
French to effectively establish the protectorate land in Morocco in 1912.
Born in Fes in 1873, Mohammed Al-Kettani was one of the most important Sufis of
early 20th century Morocco. He was among the most prominent figures of the Idrisside
lineage, founded during the medieval period. The Idrissides traced descent from the
Prophet Mohammed, earning members of the lineage the honorific “sharif” and
enhancing the saintly authority of Sufi leaders like Al-Kettani. However, other lineages
also claimed descent from the Prophet, notably the Alaouites, who had ruled the Kingdom
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Burke, “Fez and the Muslim City,” in The Ethnographic State, 149.
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of Morocco since the mid-17th century.11 The position of the sharifian Alaouite sultan
was entitled the Ameer Al-Moumineen, or the Commander of the Faithful, the supreme
religious authority in Morocco.12 The similar claims to religious and political authority of
these two lineages paved the way for later interactions, be it cooperation or conflicts. As a
matter of fact, Mohammed Al-Kettani’s fame as an important political and saintly figure
could be said to have made conflict with the Alaouite sultan inevitable. In fact, the power
of the prestigious Idrisside lineage extended politico-religious legitimacy to the entire
Kettaniyya order.13 This claim to legitimacy paved the road for Al-Kettani’s subsequent
mobilization against polarized factions in the country.
One of the mobilization strategies of Al-Kettani was to wage the greater jihad, the
spiritual struggle in defense of Islam and its doctrines. It was this kind of “ ‘spiritual
pathway’ that could unite the Sufi group together in order to wipe out all infidels and
invaders who threatened the collective benefits and legitimacy of the Muslims, including
the Sufis.”14 Al-Kettani unwaveringly waged this greater jihad for the sake of revealing
his staunch and steadfast attitude toward the enemies, whether the domestic sultan or the
foreign colonial forces.
In addition, Mohammed Al-Kettani upheld a particular point of view on the
One should keep in mind that there are other ruling families who claimed religious power
in the country, including the Sa’adis. For the main purpose of this thesis, however, I will only
discuss the conflicts between the Alaouites and the Idrisside’s descendant of Mohammed
Al-Kettani.
12 Bulletin de l’enseignement public (Protectorat de la République française au Maroc, 1926),
60.
13 Ibid., 60.
14 Cheikh Anta Babou, “The Emergence of Amadu Bamba, 1853-95,” in Fighting the
Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal (Athens: Ohio
University Press, 2007), 58. I used this source as a major secondary source to the seminar paper
last semester in the class of “Senior Seminar in International Studies.”
11

18

interpretation and reasoning strategy of religious texts. One of the most significant
aspects of his approach was “the claim to interpretative authority on the basis of
esotericism rather than exotericism (Sufism rather than Fiqh).”15 Al-Kettani represented
an ahistorical Sufi who engaged in the ijtihad, or personal endeavor in interpreting the
Sufi/Islamic creeds and sacred texts, rather than historical (and contextual) modes of
interpretation associated with Fiqh, or the traditional practice of Islamic jurisprudence.
The fundamental demarcation between his approach and that of the urban scholarly
classes, as shall be discussed more extensively in the next section, was the different
extent of emphasis on rationally interpreting/consulting the Islamic principles. After all,
the perception of Al-Kettani’s national and religious interest, through his own
comprehension of interpretational authority, deemed him a popular figure in his Sufi
circle. Before probing deeper into a detailed layout of Al-Kettani’s political mobilization
vis-à-vis the national sultan, the act of the greater jihad of the Sufi leader was undertaking,
prior to the official time when Morocco had fallen into the French protectoral
administration in 1912, shall shed light on the context of their adversarial nature.
Mohammed Al-Kettani assembled rural tribes and Sufis to unanimously encourage
Abdel-Hafid, the then Alaouite sultan of Morocco from 1908 to 1912, to fulfill the
promises he had made as part of the conditional allegiance, or the bay’a, including just
rule and political transparency, avoidance of consulting foreign power on domestic issues,
full readiness to contain any outside attacks, and other conditions that dealt with ensuring
15 Sahar Bazzaz, “Challenging Power and Authority in Pre-Protectorate Morocco: Shaykh
Muhammad Al-Kattani and the Tariqa Kattaniyya.” (PhD dissertation. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2002), 14.
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domestic peace.16 Nonetheless, under pressure from the French administration in the
country, Abdel-Hafid did not fulfill his promises when taking over the sultanate in 1909,
which led to the uprising of the Kettaniyya brotherhood in the same year.17 This event
planted the seed for ongoing conflicts and clashes between rural Sufi orders and the
makhzan, which sparked a large scope of mobilization.
In his lifetime as a devout Sufi believer, Mohammed Al-Kettani conducted esoteric
behavior in almost all aspects of his life. This ascetic performance entailed the
“abstinence from European production and worldly consumption and fully abidance by
the laws of God in all aspects of life.”18 The staunch upholding of Sufi Islamic doctrines
served as a basis for the leader’s assemblage of rural disciples and Berbers, who were
willing to follow the religious cheikh, or the saint. This fundamental principle would
constitute one of the competing factors between Mohammed Al-Kettani and the urban
ulama, who were aligned with the Alaouite sultan.
Despite the importance to his followers of his esoteric and ascetic persona, the
religious and political orientation of Mohammed Al-Kettani shifted dramatically as
French power in the country increased. In contrast to the previous ultra-ascetic life of a
Sufi, Al-Kettani sought to pursue the Sufi-Salafist route in his later phases of career. The
Salafiyya doctrines centered on the return to the pure Islam of the prophetic eras under
the leadership of the rightly guided Companions and Caliphs. Nonetheless, as this
Retrieved from an online article content called “Ulma Nasihon: Mohammed Ibn
Abdel-Kabir Al-Kettani.”
17 Trenga and Maitrot de la Motte Capron, Journal D’un Israélite de Fès, 1908-1910, 126.
18 Henry Munson, “Al-Kattani and the Ulama (1904-1909),” in Religion and Power in
Morocco (Yale University Press, 1993), 62.
16
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ideology developed in response to European colonialism in the region, Salafists were
willing to adopt certain technologies and values associated with European modernity,
such as the popularity of print journalism, to the extent that Islamic political and religious
thought would flourish.19 Henceforth, the Sufi cheikh combined both Sufi and Salafist
dogmatic and practical strategies for religious legitimacy with the goal of establishing a
“representative constitutional regime” in the country.20 He believed that the imposition of
this regime would strengthen the religious legitimacy of both Sufi saints and the sultanate
in the country and provide a check against French incursions.
When he traveled to Egypt and Mecca between 1903 and 1904, Al-Kettani witnessed
European colonialism as an authoritarian and hegemonic project, la mission civilisatrice,
in the language of the French power.21 The awareness of imperial encroachment served
as an impulse toward further recruitment and assemblage of rural elites in order to
counter outside forces. The increasing number of Sufis attracted the attention from the
makhzan, headed by the Alaouite sultan.
Al-Kettani’s combination of Sufi tradition and Salafist ideology elevated the
widespread belief in his baraka, or charismatic blessing.22 Al-Kettani reconstituted, if not
replaced, his esoteric Sufi life in reminding the ulama and other religious figures of the
significance of jihad. This reformed strategy underscored his liability as a constant
19 I retrieved all these characteristics of the Salafiyya movement from course lectures when I
was in Morocco in 2019, in which the class of “The Islamic World and the West” has contributed
considerably to my understanding of conflicts and clashes between the western world and the
Islamic Salafiyya thought, in addition to the Maghrebian region.
20 Abdellah Hammoudi, Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan
Authoritarianism (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 17.
21 See “Muttasawaf Istihwatihim Al-sulta al-rabia’a” in the Assabah website page.
22 Munson, “Al-Kattani and the Ulama,” 63.
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guardian of Islam. Henceforth, his embracing of both the power of baraka and the
reformist idea not only further drew a great range of popular support from rural areas to
wage jihad, but also stood out as a clear-cut challenge to the urban ulama, thus “adding to
the aura of sanctity and mystery that surrounded him.”23 This served as a platform to
attract a great deal of Sufi supporters and rural allies. Another objective of challenging
the urban ulama was to establish a representative constitutional regime in the nation, that
is, the fulfillment of the conditional allegiance from the Alaouite sultan. 24 This
commitment to reform the central political regime is essential to understanding the
Sufi-Salafist hybrid of Mohammed Al-Kettani’s reform project.
The ambivalence of Mohammed Al-Kettani toward the urban ulama was not only
predicated on doctrinal and practical differences, but also political differences. On the one
hand, the Moroccan ulama “accused him of aspiring to replace Abd al-Aziz as sultan.”25
Interestingly enough, it was actions of the ulama that led to the growing hostility between
Abdel-Aziz and Al-Kettani since the urban scholarly classes questioned the legitimacy of
the Sufi cheikh in 1896.26 This accusation of heresy vis-à-vis Al-Kettani propelled the
Kettaniyya order’s uprising against Abdel-Hafid between 1908 and 1909.
On the other hand and more importantly, Al-Kettani complained vigorously about the
inability of the scholars to maintain national order when confronting with foreign colonial

Ibid., 63.
“Ulma Nasihon: Mohammed Ibn Abdel-Kabir Al-Kettani.”
25 Munson, “Al-Kattani and the Ulama,” 76.
th
26 The details of this prior conflict between both factions (at the end of the 19 century) are
complex to lay out in this paper because of its limited scope and time period, but I shall clarify
some main points in the following sections. For more information, see Bazzaz, “Challenging
Power and Authority in Pre-Protectorate Morocco,” 81-152.
23
24
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forces, which led to the failure to contain them through the banner of Islam. According to
him, the ulama focused exclusively on their own interests and personal fame—the role as
Islamic authorities to interpret the religious texts of the Islamic religion and disseminate
religious knowledge to the Muslim umma, or the community. Al-Kettani emphasized that
this tremendously weakened the Muslims’ confrontation with the foreign power. In stark
contrast with the conduct of the ulama, Mohammed Al-Kettani foregrounded the duty of
Muslims/Sufis as guardians of Islam, which became more pronounced and prominent in
his later endeavors, both religious and political. It is now time to turn to the religious and
political struggle of Al-Kettani between 1908 and 1909 and how this influenced his
legitimacy and popularity among the Kettaniyya brotherhood writ large.

The seed and dissemination of jihad
The French troops invaded Morocco in 1907, sending massive military forces to
Rabat, Casablanca, and Marrakech. The French press and colonial administrators laid out
the approximate number of troops, including cavalry and infantry.27 Furthermore, they
mapped out the environmental and demographic information in large cities in order to
better facilitate the colonial project.28 They even outlined the political and religious
struggle between the Alaouite sultan and Mohammed Al-Kettani, in light of their
divergent viewpoints toward Islam and their respective claims to authority. As
Abdel-Hafid gathered urban elites and troops to topple Abdel-Aziz’s sultanate in 1908,
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Mohammed Al-Kettani supported the former because he thought that the new sultan
might rescue the nation from foreign encroachment, which was deteriorating the
economic and social foundation of Morocco. Nonetheless, when the Sufi leader perceived
the severe physical torture that Abdel-Hafid imposed upon his brother Abdel-Aziz instead
of effectively containing the influx of the French troops, he was concerned and urged
Abdel-Hafid to proclaim his authority on throne as a new Alaouite sultan in order to
protect the country in 1908. 29 As mentioned earlier, the failed fulfillment of the
conditional allegiance functioned as an impetus for Al-Kettani to mobilize the greater
jihad against the sultan starting in late 1908. The troops of the sultanate soon subverted
most of Al-Kettani’s forces, which led to his fleeing to Fes in 1909. A few months later,
Abdel-Hafid captured the Sufi cheikh and beat him to death in May of the same year.30
The events of 1908-1909 revealed Mohammed Al-Kettani’s ambivalent attitude
toward both major political actors—the French colonial forces and the domestic sultan.
His approach fused the maintenance of national order with religious legitimacy of the
Kettaniyya brotherhood. His objective of organizing the Sufi forces in the rural regions
signaled the starting point of large-scale opposition to Alaouite sultan.
As aforementioned, the different attitude toward the interpretation of Islamic
jurisprudence laid the foundation of the rivalry between Mohammed Al-Kettani and the
urban ulama. As professional jurists and Islamic scholars, the ulama abided strictly by the
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religious principles underlying the Islamic jurisprudential system, the ijma’, or the
unanimous consensus, over the ijtihad. 31 Al-Kettani, on the other hand, embraced
personal endeavor in interpreting the Islamic shari’a.32 As a long-term struggle between
the two sides, each faction regarded their respective principles, ijma’ and ijtihad, as more
paramount than the other. It was Al-Kettani’s particular emphasis on personal effort in
interpreting the sacred texts and shari’a of Islam that aroused the communal ire of the
ulama, who defied and denounced unceasingly the Sufi leader as an “unorthodox
figure.”33 This demarcation between an ahistorical viewpoint toward interpretation and a
historical/classical treatment demonstrates not only the doctrinal differences between the
two, but also the increasing entrenchment of both in their own ideological and religious
cohorts. The rising fault line paved the road for later outright oppositions to and overt
accusations against the sharifian sultan of Morocco.
The political split between the Alaouite sultan and Mohammed Al-Kettani between
1908 and 1909 initiated the waging of the greater jihad, in the extent that Al-Kettani
fostered “spiritual pathway” toward his cohorts and allies for the defense of religious
legitimacy and national security. The colonial journal depicted the strategies and the
stages of the mobilization of the Sufi leader with a particular focus on its “fanatic
militancy” and “armed violence.” However, I argue that this biased attitude toward
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Al-Kettani’s intent had downplayed the essential meaning of “the greater jihad,” which,
as mentioned earlier, stressed the religious and spiritual unity of the Muslim community
in order to wipe out all threatening enemies and infidels. Therefore, the religious intention
of the Sufi cheikh cemented his own symbolic capital and personality, prompting the
popularity of his circles in combatting against polarized factions within the country.
The morale of the Sufi “troops” was evident in that “every day, they held meetings
on the subject of Djehad. To this enterprise, the fanatics donated considerable sums. The
army chief was El Qittani.” 34 The “donation” and “meetings” were important and
proactive in this context because they reinforced the leadership of the Kettaniyya cheikh.
The scale of Al-Kettani’s supporters was enormous relative to those of the sultan. As laid
out also in the colonial correspondence in 1908, “Apart from the rural forces and the
Fassis who continually showed up at El Qittani’s to be drafted, 10,000 infantrymen were
at the disposal of El Qittani to leave at the first signal.”35 It is worth remarking that the
scale of the Kettaniyya leader’s “army” that vied with the French invasion prior to the
incident of Abdel-Hafid was much smaller than the one mentioned above. The 1908
deployment was due to the changing attitude and strategy of Al-Kettani. The highly
mobilized forces of the Kettaniyya brotherhood (and their allies) threatened the Alaouite
sultan. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the purpose of Al-Kettani’s mobilizing his
forces signified the spiritual jihad in conformance with the Islamic/Sufi principles. His
approach was not meant to wage violent and physical war. As aforementioned, because of
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its nature of being “a spiritual pathway” of uniting all pious believers, the greater jihad
was a purely religious and spiritual undertaking. That was why Mohammed Al-Kettani,
despite his hatred toward Abdel-Aziz, rejected simultaneously the brutal act of
Abdel-Hafid toward his brother. 36 This deeper overtone emphasized the religious
legitimacy and baraka power of the Sufi leader, in which this trait fostered a number of
followers and allies in the rural region.
The shifting power from the Alaouite sultan to the fierce Sufi leader, foregrounded
his role not only as a religious reformer, but also a political actor within the framework of
Sufi resistance against the Alaouite makhzan. Edmund Burke, a well-known specialist in
Middle Eastern history and Oriental Studies, pinpointed the demarcation between the
jihad of Abdel-Hafid and that of Mohammed Al-Kettani in that he stated that jihad “had
important populist overtones and was able to gain broad support. Because of the broad
and substantial appeal of its doctrine, it could provide a program and an ideology for
movements as different as those of Abd al-Hafiz and of Al-Kittani.”37 In stressing the
defining feature of jihad as “populist overtones,” “ a program,” and “an ideology,” it
becomes clear that Al-Kettani’s mobilization strategy was distinct from that of the
Alaouite sultan since the Sufi cheikh possessed baraka power and symbolic capital. Thus,
his personality did appeal to Sufi supporters. The coherent power of Al-Kettani’s
mobilization in the rural arena triggered large-scale dissent against the sultan and his
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cohorts. Therefore, it operated as a base for unification and alignment within his own
circles.
Instead of stressing the violent and bellicose aspects of jihad, Burke conveys a vision
of its pervasive influence and far-flung popularity among rural notables. Using the case of
Mohammed Al-Kettani as a springboard, Burke provides on the one hand, a specific
picture of the meaning of jihad in safeguarding national benefits and religious legitimacy
of a particular Sufi figure, which explicitly promoted the coherency of the Sufi
communities; on the other hand, he refines the notion of contested legitimacy against the
political control of the sultanate regime between 1908 and 1909.

The negotiation of power: The contentious nature of the king/saint relationship
The ambivalent attitude of Mohammed Al-Kettani toward the Alaouite sultan was
tantamount to the adversarial relationship between the sharifian state of Morocco and the
symbolic capital of the Sufi leader. This particular contestation was based on the
changing and dynamic power relation of king/saint in Morocco, especially the reasons
and evident repercussions of this potential change. The king/saint relationship played a
preponderant role in illustrating the salient nature between the two competing factions.
The foundation of this balance between the two polarized factions stemmed from the
dialectics of what Fatima Ghoulaichi called, “king/saint relationship.” According to her
point of view, although the usage of the baraka was in tandem with the symbolic capital
of either the sharifian sultan or the saintly cheikh, “the content and operation were highly
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versatile. They were negotiated among king, saint, and the historical conditions which
offered a range of possibilities that the saint and king must exploit.” 38 Ghoulaichi
pinpointed the inseparable linkage between the historical incidents in Morocco and the
power negotiation of king/saint relationship. On the basis of historical documents by
colonial officers regarding the treatment of Mohammed Al-Kettani after his rebellion
against Abdel-Hafid, the latter fiercely imposed his anger upon the survivors of the
campaign and the Kettani allies, who were subjected to successive beating and torturing
but never admitted their defeat. 39 The violent operation against the Kettaniyya
brotherhood showcased the tenuous relationship between the state and the religious saint
in the rural region. In the wake of the “rebellion,” the sultanate sought to weaken Sufi
(and tribal) communities in order to ensure sovereign power over Morocco, as a sharifian
state.
The highly contentious attitude of the sultan weakened the religio-political prestige
of himself when confronting with Mohammed Al-Kettani’s resistance and his
Sufi-Salafist viewpoint on this issue.40 This adversarial nature foregrounded his failed
regime in the eyes of the Sufi leader. The French was struck by the fact that Al-Kettani
had redirected the force of his opposition to the Alaouite sultan instead of the colonial
forces, which had arrived in the country in 1907. The attitude of the Sufi cheikh was clear
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when:
The Kittani passed through Beni Mtir, an important tribe between Fez and Meknes.
From there he proclaimed jihad but the sultan declared it unworthy. Kittani and his
parties suggested that this movement was not directed against the French.41
The plenipotentiary minister of France to Morocco, Regnault, drafted and wrote this
statement to Pichon, the minister of foreign affairs, in order to inform him about the
recent condition and deployment of the Kettaniyya brotherhood vis-à-vis the Alaouite
sultan. In this message, Mohammed Al-Kettani was represented as “proclaiming his jihad”
against an ineffective sultan who regarded the movement as “unworthy” and useless. This
remark suggested that the French understood the Sufi cheikh’s opposition to the sharifian
state to have surpassed his opposition to their own presence in the country. In other words,
Regnault was expressing surprise that the Sufi cohorts were directing their power against
their own sultan instead of the French armies.
This shift highlighted the changing political orientation of Mohammed Al-Kettani
vis-à-vis the sharifian sultan, which further widened the gap between the Alaouite throne
and the Sufi saint. The antagonism between the two parties was cemented by the decision
the Kettaniyya Sufi group to “rebel” against the state for the sake of religious legitimacy
and national interests. The tension between the two factions revealed the considerable
symbolic capital of the Sufi leader.
Another effective factor in this dynamic relationship was the balance of cultural
power between the Alaouite sultan and the Sufi leader. As mentioned earlier, the
maintenance of power of the sultan was founded on the constant negotiation of contract
41
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and allegiance, the bay’a. The failure of effectively negotiate or fulfill this contract would
instigate popular uprisings, either from rural notables or urban elites. The colonial journal
had documented some of the conduct of the Alaouite sultan since 1907. Nevertheless, the
record was is full of terms such as “ardent,” “appalling,” and “excessive,” which might
suggest a distorted picture of the critical events. Nevertheless, if read critically, such
sources can help illuminate the nuances within this ongoing conflict, both in terms of
religious jihad and political mobilization.
According to the colonial officials, Abdel-Hafid’s abandonment of the conditional
allegiance was due to his “drinking excessively of liquors and wine in defiance of the
Koranic laws. Under the fury of insobriety, he indulged himself in appalling excesses. A
great deal of ardent religious marabouts left him, including that of El-Kittani, who fled to
Fes immediately.”42 Besides the inability to wage jihad against the occupying French
forces, Abdel-Hafid may have been perceived as insufficiently pious by his subjects. This
perception likely provoked Al-Kettani’s determination to call into question the legitimacy
of the sharifian lineage and the claims to authority of the sultan, which in turn led to the
massive uprising against the makhzan forces and the relative minimization (even
abandonment) of mobilization against the French. This was a turning point in
Al-Kettani’s strategy. His mobilization was henceforth directed at establishing a just and
transparent “representative constitutional regime” for the country.
Ultimately, this clash resulted in the sultan’s revenge and destruction of Al-Kettani’s
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Sufi zawiya. 43 The power relation is prominent in this context. When Abdel-Hafid
perceived the latent threat of the Sufi cheikh in challenging his sharifian authority and
national symbol as Ameer Al-Moumineen, the repercussion was catastrophic for
Mohammed Al-Kettani. The Alaouite sultan brutally killed the Sufi cheikh and “secretly
placed his corpse in the remote region away from pilgrimage sites, in fear of that place
would later become a destination for pilgrimage and spiritual visitation.” 44 This
displacement of the corpse (and tomb) manifested complicated power relation between
the two parties, as the destruction and displacement of the saint’s tomb were considered
religious blasphemy. In addition, the “secret” performance of burying the corpse of the
Sufi leader showcased the fear of the sultan of massive revenge from various Sufi
brotherhoods that were allied with the Kettaniyya order, indicating his awareness of the
increasing polarization of the two factions.45 Apparently, Al-Kettani did not “survive”
under successive repressions from the sharifian sultan, but one should not downplay the
impact of power relation between the two political actors in a larger sense. The following
section shall examine in detail the mobilization strategy of Mohammed Al-Kettani in
entrenching his popularity and symbolic capital within his Sufi order and tribal notables.
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Cohesion and unity: paths towards consolidation
Given the large-scale military forces and the strong regional interests within religious
and rural communities in Morocco, including the Sufi orders, 46 the Alaouite
administration enjoyed a somewhat stabilized system prior to the intrusion of the colonial
forces in 1907. Nevertheless, the regional authorities/leaders, such as Mohammed
Al-Kettani, challenged the centralization of the Alaouite tradition. Indeed, the tie between
the sharifian state and the rural areas signified the ongoing division between two
geographical spaces, with tension arising whenever either space sought to challenge the
other in light of domestic or foreign turmoil. That said, the Sufi leader would have never
achieved his prestige and power of jihad had he not promoted inner cohesion and unity of
tribal system among his fellow disciples in his brotherhood. Between 1908 and 1909,
Al-Kettani fused his political power with the communal support from a great deal of
tribal and Sufi forces, which mainly operated as a stronghold withstanding any opposing
parties and outside encroachment per se. The following discussion will center on his
approach (es) that led to the rising power.
As formulated in the theoretical section, the theory of segmentation provides a lens of
regulating the interaction of political units in order to maintain order and control over
highly diversified factions in the Moroccan tribal society. The coherence among group
members and religious fellows serves as a significant premise of ensuring regulations and
collective management in that the rural notables, under Mohammed Al-Kettani, tended to
46 Burke listed a great deal of factors to maintain domestic order in Morocco, but destroyed
in the hands of diversified religious communities and military power. For more details, see “Abd
Al-Hafiz in Power,” in Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco, 152.
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be aligned with existing power for religious legitimacy and national security. However,
the Sufi cheikh had to recourse to fight against French encroachment into the country and
the failed regime of Abdel-Hafid and his cohorts. As a result, he chose to direct allies in
order to root out the threatening factions. In the case of Mohammed Al-Kettani and his
cohorts, the act of jihad and political resistance against Abdel-Hafid manifests the
refinement of the entrenched theory of segmentation. The exclusion from the benefits of
the political system led to challenges to the regime.47
As mentioned earlier, the embarking of greater jihad under the leadership of
Mohammed Al-Kettani attracted a large number of tribal leaders and religious followers
in combatting against the weakened Hafidiyya regime. Abdel-Hafid’s retreat enraged a
number of tribal leaders in that “they had been partisans of a militant anti-French stance.
Much the same thing was true of the partisans of al-Kattani at Fez.”48 Burke pinpointed
the united power of the “anti-French” forces in upholding Al-Kettani. Nonetheless, he
used the word “militant” rather in an exaggerated manner as to signify the physical
strength and scope of the military “troops” of the Sufi leader. As aforementioned, one has
to be aware of the religious dimensions of the greater jihad in order to better understand
the intention and political objective of the movement. In fact, Al-Kettani contributed to a
massive amount of “militant forces” among rural populations for the sake of constituting
a clear threat to the Alaouite sultan, as French forces had witnessed, while cementing his
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religious ideology and goal as the guardian of Islam and charismatic leader.49
Evidently, the traditional characteristic of the Moroccan tribal system relied upon the
legitimation of baraka, blessing or charisma, of the Sufi saint, or leader. Mohammed
Al-Kettani was one of the most prominent figures whose charisma has shaped his
religious struggle against political and social corruption under the leadership of
Abdel-Hafid between 1908 and 1909. This spiritual force not only operated as a
foundation for his political resistance against the Alaouite sultan, but also his rallying
strategy for attracting local supports. What is worth emphasizing is the indispensable role
of kinship played in this leverage. Indeed, the basic element for social cohesion and
solidarity was through kinship and family lineages. Ernest Gellner sheds light on the
general traits of “legitimate ‘saints’ of the Atlas” as “charismatic leaders, who are
identified and legitimated by the possession of baraka, but theirs is a charisma heavily
routinized by kinship.”50 Gellner stressed the “routinization of kinship” in pinpointing
the charismatic leaders of the religious saints. In other words, he emphasized both the
conventional and religious features of any saint in the Moroccan rural regions.
Mohammed Al-Kettani would have never acquired legitimate popularity without his
charismatic power.
In this context, kinship represented his Sufi followers in the Kettaniyya brotherhood;
charisma signified his unremitting jihad and charismatic power in confronting with the
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Alaouite sultan. 51 A number of instances further cemented the ongoing power and
popularity of Mohammed Al-Kettani in assembling his allies. The following sections
manifest some concrete approaches of Mohammed Al-Kettani in reinforcing his religious
legitimacy, including but not limited to, the popularity of print journalism and the
unifying da’awa, or collective calling, that served as a tremendous impetus for his
movement.

The jumping point of printed culture: an alternative step toward legitimacy
Culturally speaking, Mohammed Al-Kettani instrumentalized and mobilized his Sufi
and tribal circles through the various standpoint and attitude toward modernized print
journalism. This cultural-political agenda crafted and honed the polarized factions in a
larger extent. In the following paragraphs, I seek to analyze, on the one hand, the
consolidation of Al-Kettani’s Sufi-Salafist propaganda in uniting the tribal notables, and
on the other hand, the role of cultural activism in carrying out his actions on site between
1907 and 1909.
The particular concentration on Mohammed Al-Kettani’s gradual process toward his
Sufi-Salafist ideology not only drove, but also enlarged the scope of his protests against
the French power and the competent ulama in Fes, manifesting new skills of propaganda
and cultural mobilization writ large. These modernized tools of expression redefined how
the realization of countering against various political factors was attainable. At the earlier

51 For further details and inferences, see “Muttasawaf Istihwatihim Al-sulta al-rabia’a” in the
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phase of the French conquest in Morocco from around 1903, Mohammed Al-Kettani
strove to oppose the encroachment of French power into Morocco. He founded the Arabic
“The Plague” newspaper in order to counter the western influence on his country. He
openly criticized “The Sa’ada,” an Arabic pro-Aziz newspaper launched in Tangier as the
mouthpiece of French power in the beginning of the colonial conquest in Morocco
between 1903 and 1904. 52 On account of the incapability of Abdel-Aziz and his
associated Islamic ulama in containing the French invasion, Al-Kettani was eager to
broaden his mobilization through different approaches.
Susan Miller has explicated the political focal point of Al-Kettani’s mobilizing power
in that “he determined to present himself as an alternative to the reactionary ulama. He
broke with tradition in other ways, too; he understood the power of the printed work and
published and distributed political pamphlets, spreading news of his reformist agenda far
and wide.”53 Setting the foundation and distribution of political pamphlets, agendas, and
newspapers as a fulcrum point, Miller highlighted Al-Kettani’s “breaking up with
tradition.” However, this has nothing to do with the abandonment of his Sufi tradition or
ritual. Rather, the Sufi cheikh promoted his reformist agenda by “presenting himself as an
alternative to the reactionary ulama.” As in stark contrast with the impotent Islamic
authorities, Mohammed Al-Kettani emerged as an alternative figure in rooting out
political corruption within the country and the colonial forces without. Put differently, the
cornerstone of this “breaking up with tradition” reconstituted and reinforced his political
See “Muttasawaf Istihwatihim Al-sulta al-rabia’a” in the Assabah website page.
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orientation, that is to say, the Sufi-Salafist viewpoint through western-style print culture.
Indeed, his usage of both “The Plague” and “The Sa’ada” newspaper served as an
operation of drawing greater popular support as an alternative to the feeble regime under
Abdel-Aziz in 1907.
Moreover, and in terms of rallying popular support in the political field, Mohammed
Al-Kettani underlined and adopted cultural production as an effective means to
re-establish legitimacy and popularity. The pivotal aspect of expression via press and
journalism had provided Al-Kettani a firm basis for fighting against political and
religious inefficiency in Morocco, starting from 1904 and culminating in his death in
1909.54 In particular, his denouncement of “The Saada” newspaper was clear and evident
in defining and defending his mobilization. The newspaper insinuated that Al-Kettani was
driven by political ambitions rather than religious zeal and that his religious leadership
was therefore hypocritical. At the same time it suggested that the makhzan was
underestimating the threat of the movement:
The makhzan turned away from Al-Kettani, believing that the intention of the man
was not for religion’s sake. Rather, he carried out other purposes while elevating his
faith as a flag. Therefore, the makhzan did not watch the causes of the Sufi cheikh in
an attentive way, nor did he monitor the case in a considerate manner. The makhzan
itself knew what Al-Kettani was hiding from the sultan and from the Berbers.55
This passage emphasizes the shady intentions of Al-Kettani. It also reveals that
French administrators simply believed that he was eager to topple the Alaouite sultanate
It is worth noting that even though his Sufi sites, or zawiyas, were closed following his
death in 1909, the legacy of his endeavors and undertaking has never stopped growing, especially
through his later disciple and relative Abdel-Hay Al-Kettani when leveraging with the French
forces in 1953.
55 See this source on “Muttasawaf Istihwatihim Al-sulta al-rabia’a.” Translation was my
own.
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and claimed it for himself after Abdel-Hafid. However, as biased as this
French-sponsored and financed newspaper was, it still testifies to the power of
Al-Kettani’s call for the greater jihad and his gathering of rural allies and Sufis. In stark
contrast with the presumptions of the French, this mobilization manifested his goals of
ensuring Sufi legitimacy and protecting the nation from corruption within and
encroachment without. After all, the failure of Abdel-Hafid in fulfilling his conditional
allegiance ignited the resistance and large-scale protests in the rural region. Henceforth,
“The Sa’ada” newspaper, along with many other colonial journals and reports, distorted
the attitude and goals of Mohammed Al-Kettani, which has led to prejudices, at best, and
falsity, at worst, in the historical record. Al-Kettani’s denunciation of the biased “The
Sa’ada” newspaper cemented the collective identity of the Sufi brotherhood and
reinforced a shared consciousness of how opposition against the state could be expressed.

Patriotic da’awa: the fortification of the baraka power
Besides the powerful efficacy of and resistance against newspaper publication in
rallying popular support from the rural area, Mohammed Al-Kettani had recourse to a
collective calling, or da’awa, among fellow tribal notables and Sufi believers, in the hope
of raising awareness and supporters to resist the Hafidiyya regime. More precisely, the
collective da’awa “defines Muslim politics in the broadest sense of symbolic practice,
persuasion, and transformation beyond the state’s formal intervention.”56 This calling
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draws public attention to national security and religious legitimacy in light of domestic or
outside threats. In the case of Mohammed Al-Kettani, the da’awa proved his symbolic
weight as a guardian of Islam and an advocate of the greater jihad he had always striven
for. The objective of this unifying communication was to call upon rural and Sufi
supporters for his “authorial repetition—sainthood and the baraka power.” 57 The
emphasis on his “sainthood” illustrated the spiritual unity to the whole Muslim/Sufi
umma in the country in order to direct against the political order. The intersection of ritual
call and national summons forged and reinforced the collective identity and shared
consciousness of each Sufi during Al-Kettani’s “campaign” between 1908 and 1909. This
deepening of relationships within the Kettaniyya brotherhood honed the inner cohesion of
the Sufis as well as the religio-cultural defense of Sufi identity. This section seeks to
explore French interest in Moroccan culture, not so much for its urban and political
elitism than for its religious and rural mysticism, including Sufism and religious rituals
within the peripheral regions in general. It would then trace the communicative power of
the Sufi order, the da’awa, under the leadership of Mohammed Al-Kettani in reinforcing
cohesion and unity among his Sufi allies.
The French administrators had put much attention to and interest in the mystical
aspect of the Sufi orders in general, which served as a springboard for their colonial
project and undertaking in North Africa. I argue that this led to neglect of other
dimensions of Sufi activity, such as, in the case of Mohammed Al-Kettani, its association
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with the political struggle against the Alaouite sultanate between 1908 and 1909.
According to remarks from a colonial report, “it seems that the deep taste of mystical
obsessions was in accordance with sensual desire and infatuation.”58 What caught the
eyes of the French administrators were the ritual performances of the Sufi communities in
Morocco. Even though the comparison of their rituals to carnal and erotic “desire and
infatuation” trivialized the role ritual played in the Sufi community, this aspect of
religious practice intrigued the French into exploring more and even attempting to
promote such customs, especially in the remotely rural regions.59 This support for the
ritual aspect of Sufi tradition had several long-lasting implications, both to the colonizing
forces and the Sufi groups.
The French colonizers acknowledged that “Morocco was always the land for magic
par excellence: magic has been preserved and developed with a very particular intensity
in the context of fierce isolation and Moroccan obscurity.”60 The author of this journal
page highlighted the unique characteristics of Sufi magic and ritual in Morocco. The
word “isolation” conveyed the estrangement from the political atmosphere in the urban
areas without and closeness of religious/mystical communities in the rural regions within;
the term “obscurity” further attested to the strangeness and mystical aura of the “Sufi
magic” par excellence. The French, given their denial of modern and civilized aspects of
the Kettaniyya order, were eager to promote the mystical practices of the Sufi order not
only to serve their own interest within their civilizing mission blueprint, but also to take
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precaution against protests and resistance, which sprang from the sharifian state, the
urban ulama, and other parties in the country, through the “military aid” of the Kettaniyya
allies. Henceforth, Sufi ritual served as a foundation for Mohammed Al-Kettani’s forging
of a shared identity within his Sufi disciples, which ultimately furthered their political
aims, even if those are downplayed and misrepresented in French sources.
In addition to ritual, another significant driving force of the collective consciousness
of the Kettaniyya disciples was the national call, a communal da’awa for resistance.
Regarding the communicative role of the call, the mobilizing force Al-Kettani transmitted
echoed his disciples and other tribal leaders that were close to him either in distance or,
religiously speaking, in soul, sending powerful messages in the name of Moroccans at
large in the hope of resisting the incapable Abdel-Hafid. As mentioned before, the threat
of Mohammed Al-Kettani stemmed from his questioning of Abdel-Hafid’s Alaouite
legitimacy and position as Ameer Al-Moumineen. Although this suspicion had led to the
marginalization of the Kettaniyya order, either in its religious practices or its political
goal of reforming the sultanate, it strengthened the attraction of the movement among
tribal and Sufi forces. Put differently, the impressive religious assemblage Al-Kettani
called in order to carry out his national summon vis-à-vis the polarized factions enhanced
his baraka power for national security and shared identity in a larger sense.
As protest and resistance became the rallying cry for Sufis and tribal forces,
“Al-Kittani, informed that he would lead some forces to Rabat, called for unification and

42

united power against the corrupted new regime.”61 The repercussion of this calling for a
large-scale mobilization was twofold. On the one hand, the reorientation of the
Kettaniyya allies highlighted the religious conflict in Islam (more specifically, the
regional clash) within the country. On the other hand, the particular “calling for an united
power” cemented collective consciousness among the tribal forces that Al-Kettani led,
which served as an indispensable force for ensuring cohesion and organization in the
building up of tribal elites.
The cultural and political prestige of Mohammed Al-Kettani showcased his symbolic
weight in guiding the allied army forward. Even so, the colonial archives had largely
neglected the efforts of the Sufi leader in modernizing Morocco, using “biased terms” for
the sake of advancing their own colonial projects, Indeed, I suggest that Al-Kettani’s
religious and political legitimacy became manifested in his baraka power in calling upon
Sufi cohesion, less so in a “militant” objective than in pursuing a “spiritual pathway” and
da’awa.
The French journal explained that the shared identity within the heart of the
Kettaniyya brotherhood under the leadership of Al-Kettani was born “not of simple
political adversity, but outright demagoguery.”62 The term “demagoguery” had strongly
distorted Al-Kettani’s original intention on prioritizing his Sufi spiritual struggle against
the failed regime of the Alaouite sultanate. One should not downplay the Sufi cheikh’s
role as a symbolic capital of the united rural forces for national security and religious
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legitimacy. It is true that the contentious nature between him and Abdel-Hafid reinforced
the shared consciousness of Sufi followers, but the collective da’awa functioned as a
cornerstone of furthering social forces and cohesion among his cohorts. In a larger sense,
the national call summoned Moroccans across regions; it “promoted the social evolution
of the Moroccan People as it emphasized the cultural symbol as repeated and
recognizable source of the call, in which the marginal practices now amassed to form a
national practice.”63 The transcendence of regional and “marginal” space consolidated a
variety of Sufi orders aligning with Mohammed Al-Kettani for the sake of carrying out
“social evolution” and communicative effects.64 Henceforth, one can perceive the hidden
power of the Sufi cheikh when confronting with different opposing parties since his
adoption of ritual call and Sufi da’awa highlighted the communal consciousness of the
Sufi community.
The power of the political climate of the Kettaniyya brotherhood lay on the practice
of baraka, the divine grace and blessing, of the leader Mohammed Al-Kettani himself.
More specifically, he wielded saintly/religious tool as an effective means to gather
national and religious call among his community. This notion is evident from two
different scenes in which the Sufi cheikh had used (the means) for political ends. Before
marching his Sufi and tribal groups to claim the sultanate of Abdel-Hafid, “Sufi groups,
such as those Mohammed Al-Kettani led, brought a swarm of people passed by and, in
order to accomplish their goals, they had to visit the tomb and the marabout of Moulay
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Idris.” 65 From this remark, one can clearly perceive that Mohammed Al-Kettani
convened and called up his forces before the tomb of Moulay Idrisside in order to receive
baraka. The potential premise of summoning up Sufi disciples attached the divine grace
to recognition of national benefits and religious legitimacy, tightening the collective
consciousness within his Sufi disciples. In the second scenario, however, the same
mobilization of troops had aimed for a massive protest against the failed regime and
performance of Abdel-Hafid, whose actions greatly disappointed Mohammed Al-Kettani.
In this particular turning point, Mohammed Al-Kettani “summoned up his troops and
cavaliers with about 100 mules, fully charged and equipped, and passed by the house of
Zemmour, Beni Mtir, and headed towards Moulay Hafid.”66 Again, the highly visible
mobilizing power of the Sufi leader against the Alaouite sultan and his allies paved the
road for a greater mobilization power. Consequently, one should not ignore the
religio-political and cultural implications behind the massive mobilization of Mohammed
Al-Kettani. The baraka power, his ritual practices, and coherent da’awa of tribal and Sufi
forces had incited the academic taste of the French administrators. More importantly, the
power relation of the Sufi leader manifested his patriotic and religious defense in
Morocco between 1908 and 1909.
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Conclusion
Through the detailed analysis and examination of Mohammed Al-Kettani’s
tremendous contribution to the transformation of the makhzan system and unification of
the Kettaniyya community, it has become more apparent that the exceptional role of his
representation shaped and honed a shared consciousness among his cohorts. Al-Kettani’s
involvement in the Hafidiyya regime reflected his active participation in the political
domain in the early 20th century. The Sufi leader adopted the spiritual jihad in challenging
the political structures of the Alaouite sultan, in light of ensuring religious legitimacy of
his order and protecting the nation from disruptive forces. His religious struggle,
including the introduction and preservation of the baraka, modeled the way the religious
vitality was a vital drive to counter the failed regime. He furthered this influence by
seeking political alliances with rural notables and Sufi disciples, which cemented the
coherent power.
The pursuit of Mohammed Al-Kettani of “the spiritual pathway” had strengthened
his role as a devout Sufi among his cohorts, allies, and disciples. The greater jihad was a
defining feature not only in reinforcing his religious legitimacy and the baraka power
within the rural region, but also marked the political rift with Abdel-Hafid, whom
Al-Kettani believed had tremendously threatened the safety of his nation. Broadly
speaking, the symbolic capital of the Sufi cheikh in connecting and unifying his religious
community together serves as a significant agent in hardening the ties with his allies. His
usage of print culture and collective da’awa had great success in the rural arena. The
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cultural and political agenda he formulated substantially strengthened his ability to bring
about a massive mobilization and spiritual struggle for both national and religious causes.
The complex dynamics of power relations in Morocco is worthy of attention in the
viewpoints of western scholars, whose eyes have grown used to projecting simplistic and
Orientalist binaries of “Western advancement” and “Oriental backwardness.”67 In the
case of the Islamic societies, such as Morocco, there is no room left for progress and
development in their representation of Islamic history and culture other than static and
constant Islamic concepts, including Sufi thoughts and interpretative tradition of the
urban scholarly classes. Despite all these essentialist and idealist conception of the
Islamic world and the Orient, it is indispensable to accentuate, in the Kettaniyya context,
the creative element in Sufi cultures and histories in fighting against intellectual and
political hegemony over the so-called “Other.” After all, would the religio-political
objective of Sufism act as an effective antidote to modern-era Islamism and Islamist
ideology, in light of its emphasis on religious legitimacy and national defense? Under the
far-flung influence of radical Islamism, would Mohammed VI, the now Moroccan king,
seek reconciliation with rural notables and Sufis in order to root out domestic and
international threats of various kinds? Scholarly investigation on Mohammed Al-Kettani
as a historical and religious agent has the merit of and opens the door for reinterpreting
the nexus between religion and political agenda.

67 I derived this thought from reading Edward Said’s Orientalism during the winter of 2021.
See Edward Said, Orientalism (Penguin Random House, 1978), 246.
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